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Source Camera Identification Using Enhanced
Sensor Pattern Noise
Chang-Tsun Li
Abstract—Sensor pattern noises (SPNs), extracted from digital
images to serve as the fingerprints of imaging devices, have been
proved as an effective way for digital device identification. How-
ever, as we demonstrate in this work, the limitation of the current
method of extracting SPNs is that the SPNs extracted from images
can be severely contaminated by details from scenes, and as a re-
sult, the identification rate is unsatisfactory unless images of a large
size are used. In this work, we propose a novel approach for atten-
uating the influence of details from scenes on SPNs so as to improve
the device identification rate of the identifier. The hypothesis un-
derlying our SPN enhancement method is that the stronger a signal
component in an SPN is, the less trustworthy the component should
be, and thus should be attenuated. This hypothesis suggests that an
enhanced SPN can be obtained by assigning weighting factors in-
versely proportional to the magnitude of the SPN components.
Index Terms—Digital forensics, digital investigation, multimedia
forensics, sensor pattern noise (SPN), source device identification.
I. INTRODUCTION
A S THE cost of digital imaging devices, such as cam-corders, digital cameras, scanners and cameras embedded
in mobile phones, falls and the functionalities of these devices
increase, digital imaging become increasingly cheaper in our
every-day life. While digital imaging devices bring ever-in-
creasing convenience of image acquisition, powerful yet
easy-to-use digital image processing tools also provide effec-
tive means for manipulating images that can serve good and
malicious purposes. As a result, the use of digital images in
forensic investigations becomes more frequent and important.
Typical image forensics includes source device identification,
source device linking, classification of images taken by un-
known cameras, integrity verification, authentication, etc.
Usually the process of acquiring a photo with an ordinary dig-
ital camera is similar to the diagram illustrated in Fig. 1. The
light from the scene enters a set of lenses and passes through
an anti-aliasing filter before reaching a color filter array (CFA)
that is intended to admit one of the red (R), green (G), and blue
(B) components of the light per pixel for the following semicon-
ductor sensor to convert the signal into electronic form. A demo-
saicing process is subsequently carried out to get the intensities
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of the other two colors for each pixel by interpolating the color
information within a neighbourhood. A sequence of image pro-
cessing operations, such as color correction, white balancing,
Gamma correction, enhancing, JPEG compression, etc., then
take place before the photo is saved in the storage medium. The
hardware or software used in each stage in the image acquisition
pipeline as illustrated in Fig. 1 may leave unique traces in im-
ages, which can lead to the identification of the imaging device.
As such, to help with forensic investigations, researchers have
proposed ways of identifying and linking source devices, clas-
sifying images, and verifying the integrity of images based on
the detection of existence or local inconsistencies of device at-
tributes or data processing related characteristics, such as sensor
pattern noise (SPN) [1]–[8], camera response function [9], re-
sampling artefacts [10], CFA interpolation artefacts [11], [12],
JPEG compression [13], [14], lens aberration [15], [16], etc.
Other device and image attributes such as binary similarity mea-
sures, image quality measures, and higher order wavelet statis-
tics have also been exploited to identify and classify source de-
vices [17]–[19].
While many methods [9]–[12] require that specific assump-
tions be satisfied, methods based on SPN [1]–[8], [20]–[22] have
drawn much attention due to the relaxation of the similar as-
sumptions. Another advantage of SPN is that it can identify not
only camera models of the same make, but also individual cam-
eras of the same model [1], [6]. The deterministic component of
SPN is mainly caused by imperfections during the sensor man-
ufacturing process and different sensitivity of pixels to light due
to the inhomogeneity of silicon wafers [23], [24]. It is because of
the inconsistency and the uniqueness of manufacturing imper-
fections and the variable sensitivity of each pixel to light that
even sensors made from the same silicon wafer would possess
uncorrelated pattern noise, which can be extracted from the im-
ages produced by the devices. This property makes SPN a robust
fingerprint for identifying and linking source devices and veri-
fying the integrity of images. The reader is referred to [23] and
[24] for more details in relation to SPN.
II. LIMITATION OF EXISTING SPN EXTRACTION MODEL
Because SPN appears as a high-frequency signal in images,
most image forensic methods based on SPN [2]–[8] adopt the
model proposed in [1] or its variant [25] for extracting the SPN
from an image . The model is formulated as
(1)
where DWT is the discrete wavelet transform and is a de-
noising function, which filters out the SPN in the DWT do-
main. Although various denoising filters can be used as , the
wavelet-based denoising filter described in Appendix A of [1]
1556-6013/$26.00 © 2010 IEEE
Authorized licensed use limited to: WARWICK UNIVERSITY. Downloaded on July 12,2010 at 11:20:46 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
LI: SOURCE CAMERA IDENTIFICATION USING ENHANCED SPN 281
Fig. 1. Image acquisition process of an ordinary digital camera.
Fig. 2. (a) Clean reference SPN taken from blue sky images. (b) Image of a natural scene. (c) SPN extracted from (b) that is contaminated by the details from the
scene. (d) Enhanced version of (c) using Model 5 [i.e., eq. (6)] with     . Note the intensity of (a) and (c) has been up scaled 9 and 3 times, respectively, for
visualization purpose.
has been reported as effective in producing good results. We can
see from (1) that the SPN literally covers the high-frequency
components of .
The key limitation of (1) is that the SPN can be severely
contaminated by details from the scene because scene de-
tails account for the high-frequency components of and
their magnitude is far greater than that of SPN. For example,
Fig. 2(a), (b), and (c) show a reference SPN of a camera,
which is the average SPN of 50 images of blue sky taken by a
digital camera, the image of a natural scene taken by the same
camera, and the SPN extracted from the image of Fig. 2(b),
respectively. Fig. 2(a) is what a “clean” SPN should look like.
However, from Fig. 2(c) we can see that the SPN contains
strong details from the scene, which dominates the real SPN.
Note the intensity of Fig. 2(a) and (c) has been up scaled 9 and
3 times for visualization purpose.
In the scenario of SPN-based source device identification, the
investigator usually has a collection of devices or a database of
reference SPNs, each representing one device, in his/her posses-
sion. The reason of creating such a clean reference SPN—the
average of a number (say 20–50) of SPNs extracted from natural
images, as illustrated in Fig. 2(a)—is that it can better represent
the imaging camera. However, source camera linking, which is
about establishing whether or not the images under investigation
are taken by the same camera without the camera and its refer-
ence SPN in the investigator’s possession, is a more challenging
problem than source camera identification. The investigation can
only be carried out based on one SPN from each image and if
one or more SPNs are severely contaminated by the details of
the scenes, the chance of reaching a correct conclusion cannot
be expected to be high. An even more challenging application is
blind/unsupervised image classification aiming at classifying a
large set of images in the absence of the imaging cameras and
reference SPNs. Given a large number of images, classification
based on the SPNs extracted from images of their original size
(e.g., 3 or 4 mega pixels) is computationally prohibitive. This
entails the need for carrying out the classification task based on
the SPNs from smaller blocks cropped from the original images.
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However, croppingreduces thenumberofSPNcomponents, con-
sequently increasing the intraclass variation of SPNs. To address
these issues, the contaminated SPN needs to be cleaned or en-
hanced in some way. Although enhancing the SPN extracted with
(1) has been attempted by Chen et al. [25], their objective is to
attenuate the artefacts due to color interpolation, row-wise and
column-wiseoperationandJPEGcompression,ratherthantodeal
with scene interference. To our best knowledge, SPN enhancing
methodology aiming at attenuating the interference from scene
details is currently lacking. It is, therefore, our intention to pro-
pose a method for effectively enhancing SPN in Section III and
to report in Section IV a sequence of experiments carried out to
test the proposed SPN enhancers.
III. PROPOSED SPN ENHANCER
Given the fact that the magnitude of scene details tend to be
far greater than that of the SPN, as demonstrated in Fig. 2(c),
the hypothesis underlying our SPN enhancer is that
the stronger a signal component in is, the more likely
that it is associated with strong scene details, and thus the
less trustworthy the component should be.
This hypothesis suggests that an enhanced fingerprint can
be obtained by assigning less significant weighting factors to
strong components of in the Digital Wavelet Transform (DWT)
domain in order to attenuate the interference of scene details.
There are various mathematical models for realizing the afore-
mentioned hypothesis. In this work, we propose five models, as
formulated in (2)–(6) to be applied to the unenhanced SPN ex-
tracted with (1) in conjunction with the wavelet-based denoising
filter described in Appendix A of [1]
if
if
if
if
(2)
if
if
if
if
(3)
if
if
if
if
(4)
if
if
otherwise
(5)
if
otherwise
(6)
where and are the th component of and
, respectively. These five models can also be better presented
graphically as demonstrated in Fig. 3(a) to (e). Equations (2)–(4)
allow the magnitude of to grow monotonically in accordance
with the magnitude of if (a threshold to be decided
by the user) and to decrease monotonically and rapidly with
respect to if , while (5) and (6) allow the magnitude
of (i.e., ) to decrease monotonically with respect to the
magnitude of . We can see that of (2)–(6) determines the
performance of each model. These five models are not picked at
random, but are motivated by the following considerations.
1) Stronger SPN components should be attenu-
ated monotonically and rapidly with respect to to sup-
press the influence from scene details. This conforms to
the falling tails in all five models, starting from the points
where becomes greater than , although the falling
rates are different for different models.
2) For weaker SPN components (i.e., ), different
considerations as discussed later are reflected in the five
models.
— Linear transformation (Models 1 and 2), as (2)–(3) and
Fig. 3(a) to (b) suggest: This is to give those weak com-
ponents the same weight and is the most conser-
vative transformation. However, since how scene details
can be theoretically modeled is unclear, empirical tuning
of the significance of the weaker (more trustworthy)
components in some way other than linear transforma-
tion should also be studied. As such, the following two
types of transformation are also considered.
— Nonlinear exponential transformation (Model 3), as for-
mulated in (4) and illustrated in Fig. 3(c): Like the linear
transformation, this nonlinear exponential transforma-
tion is also a moderate operation because the orders of
the transformed components remain unchanged. How-
ever, by the gradients at various points of the transforma-
tion curves, we can see that the model gives greater sig-
nificance to the SPN components on the lower ends and
less significance to those closer to , while Models 1
and 2 indiscriminatively give equal weight to every
in the range . It is worth noting that no nonlinear
exponential model with a monotonically increasing (de-
creasing) transformation curve in the range
can produce effective SPN enhance-
ment. For example, a nonlinear exponential transfor-
mation (Model 6), as formulated in (7) and shown in
Fig. 3(f), does not make physical sense and should be
avoided because, by the gradients at various points of
the curves, we can see the model is giving less signif-
icance to the weaker but more trustworthy components
than the stronger but less trustworthy ones. We will dis-
cuss this in Section IV-A
if
if
if
if
(7)
Authorized licensed use limited to: WARWICK UNIVERSITY. Downloaded on July 12,2010 at 11:20:46 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
LI: SOURCE CAMERA IDENTIFICATION USING ENHANCED SPN 283
Fig. 3. Six models for digital fingerprint enhancement. (a)–(f) correspond to eq. (2)–(7), respectively.
— Inversely proportional transformation (Models 4 and
5), as formulated in (5) and (6) and illustrated in
Fig. 3(d) and 3(e): These are the most radical trans-
formations among all models because they reverse the
order of the magnitude (e.g., 0 in the unenhanced
is mapped to the maximum value of 1 in enhanced
). This is intended to lay even more trust on the
components with low magnitude. Therefore, they are
still consistent with our hypothesis because, throughout
the entire spectrum, the weaker components are given
greater significance than the stronger ones.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
In the following experiments, we use 1200 photos of 1536
2048 pixels taken in JPEG format (with JPEG quality factor ap-
proximately ranging from 93 to 97) by six cameras, each respon-
sible for 200. The six cameras are Canon IXUS 850IS, Canon
PowerShot A400, Canon IXY Digital 500, FujiFilm A602, Fu-
jiFilm FinePix A902, and Olympus FE210. The photos con-
tain a wide variety of natural indoor and outdoor scenes taken
during holidays, around campus and cities, in offices and labora-
tories, etc. To enhance an SPN, we first perform DWT, conduct
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low-pass filtering in the DWT domain, extract the SPN using
(1) in DWT domain, and finally apply an enhancement model
to the unenhanced SNP directly in the DWT domain to get the
enhanced version .
Each reference SPN, which represents each of the six cam-
eras, is generated by calculating the average of the SPNs ex-
tracted from 50 photos of blue sky taken by the digital camera.
Note because the photos of the blue sky do not contain signif-
icant high-frequency details and 50 SPNs are averaged to gen-
erate the reference SPN, we did not apply any enhancing model
to enhance those photos of blue sky. The 50 photos for creating
the reference SPN are not included in the test set in the following
experiments.
Source device identification requires similarity comparisons
among SPNs; therefore, the feasibility of the chosen similarity
metrics is important. As proposed in [22], Fridrich suggested
the use of the peak to correlation energy (PCE) measure, which
has proved to be a more stable detection statistic than normal-
ized cross-correlation when applied to the scenarios in which
the images of interest may have undergone geometrical manip-
ulations, such as rotation or scaling. The purpose of this work
is to demonstrate the capability of the proposed SPN enhancers
in dealing with the interference of details from the scene; geo-
metrical transformations will not be applied in order to prevent
biased evaluation from happening. Therefore, in the following
experiments, normalized cross-correlation will be used to mea-
sure the similarity between SPNs. The normalized cross-corre-
lation between signal and is defined as
(8)
where and are the means of and , respectively.
A. Selection of Enhancing Model and Parameter
The main theme of this work is the conception of the hy-
pothesis that the stronger a signal component in is, the more
likely that it is associated with strong scene details, and thus the
less trustworthy the component should be, while the five models
[(2)–(6)] are just to validate the hypothesis. There is no theo-
retical backing for choosing the optimal model from (2) to (6)
because the theory for modeling SPN and scene details is not in
existence at present. Feasible models other than these five can
certainly be adopted in the future if found.
We have carried out a sequence of source camera identi-
fication experiments, based on 1200 image blocks of 128
128 pixels cropped from the center of the aforementioned
1200 photos, to evaluate various combinations of the five
models [i.e., (2)–(6)] and 30 different values of in order to
validate our hypothesis. As we will demonstrate in Section IV-B
and Table II, the reason for using image blocks of this size
is that the performance of the models are not close to 100%
when image blocks of this size are used, which leaves room
for revealing the real performance of each model. To identify
the source camera of an image, the SPN is extracted from the
image and the similarity between the SPN and each of the six
reference SPNs is calculated using (8). The image is deemed as
taken by the camera corresponding to the maximum of the six
similarity values. The results are listed in Table I and plotted in
Fig. 4. The following observations can be made:
1) Models 1 and 2, formulated in (2) and (3), perform rea-
sonably well with the value of in the relatively smaller
ranges of [3, 4] and [4, 6], respectively, when compared
to the performance of the other three models. However,
as can be seen in Fig. 4, their performance curves drop
rapidly as the value of grows. This indicates that SPN
enhancement through linear transformation when
is more sensitive to changes of . Moreover, the only dif-
ference between Models 1 and 2 is that the attenuation rate
of Model 2 is greater than Model 1 when [see
Fig. 3(a) and (b)]. This factor accounts for the more mod-
erate declining rate of performance of Model 2 than that of
Model 1 after their respective performance peaks, as shown
in Fig. 4 and Table I, and indicates that a greater attenua-
tion rate is preferable for strong SPN components.
2) Model 3 applies nonlinear exponential transformation to
SPN components when . Fig. 4 indicates that it per-
forms stably well in a wider range [4, 11] of , with a peak
identification rate of 1039 out of 1200 images at ,
, and (see Table I). Moreover, its performance curve
drops more gracefully than Models 1 and 2 as grows. It
is worth noting that, according to (3) and (4), the transfor-
mation employed in Model 2 for is basically the
same as that employed in Model 3, except that the latter
has a factor of which is 1. So we can
conclude that the performance difference between the two
models is due to the nonlinear transformation effect when
, as discussed at the end of Section III. The expla-
nation for this effect is that, as shown in Fig. 3(b) and (c),
when , the gradients at various points of the trans-
formation curve of Model 2 remains constant while the
gradients of Model 3 decreases monotonically with respect
to . This means Model 2 indiscriminatively assigns an
equal weight to every component when while
Model 3 adaptively decreases the weight as grows (i.e.,
as the influence of scene details gets stronger).
3) Models 4 and 5 apply inversely proportional transforma-
tion to the SPN components when . Both models
have equivalent peak identification rate of 1039 and 1040
out of 1200 images, respectively. Model 4 performs at peak
level when , which is far greater then the value of
at which Model 5’s performance peaks. This is be-
cause when is lower the slope of the straight transforma-
tion line of Model 4 is greater, and as a result, the small and
trustworthy components get over-attenuated. However, as
shown in Fig. 4, Model 4’s performance appears to be mar-
ginally more stable than Model 5’s after its performance
peaks. This is because Model 4 sets to 0 when .
4) Although Model 6’s peak performance level (1014/1200
when ) is only 2.17% lower than the global peak
(1040/1200 of Model 5 when ), this model is not
only counterintuitive but also inconsistent with our hypoth-
esis. The main difference between Model 3 and Model
6 is that when , their transformation curves go
up towards with decreasing and increasing gradients,
respectively. This indicates that, within this range, while
Model 3 gives greater weight to the small and trustworthy
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TABLE I
PERFORMANCE, IN TERMS OF number of correct source camera identifications out of 1200 images, OF VARIOUS SPN ENHANCING MODELS WHEN
APPLIED IN CONJUNCTION WITH DIFFERENT VALUES OF  
Fig. 4. Performance, in terms of number of correct source camera identifica-
tions out of 1200 images, of various SPN enhancing models when applied in
conjunction with different values of  .
components, Model 6 does the opposite. Consequently, as
its corresponding plot in Fig. 4 shows, its performance is
highly sensitive to the value of .
From the above discussions, we can conclude that Models 1–5
are all feasible models for enhancing SPNs, with Models 3, 4,
and 5 being more preferable because they perform more stably
within wider ranges of values of . Stability is important be-
cause it gives the user high confidence in their choices. We
also observed that the highest performance level (1040/1200)
is reached by Model 5 with . However, this does not
mean that this is the optimal combination because theoretical
approaches for finding the optimal model and its parameters are
currently lacking and it is in no way possible to exhaust the in-
finite numbers of models and parameters to identify the optimal
combination.
B. Source Camera Identification
To validate our hypothesis, we have carried out camera
identification tests on the 1200 photos using Model 5 with
. Instead of testing the enhancer on the full-sized images
of 1536 2048 pixels only, we also test it on image blocks of
eight different sizes cropped from the center of the full-sized
images. Moreover, in real applications, identification should
be based on whether the similarity is greater than a feasible
threshold. Table II shows the true positive rate with and without
applying Model 5 to the SPNs extracted with (1) when a
correlation threshold of is applied. Note that in this
experiment the SPN of each image is only compared to the
reference SPN of the camera that actually took the image in
question, i.e., the source camera. The image is deemed as taken
by the source camera if the similarity value is greater than . It
is clear from Table II that the larger the image blocks are, the
greater the performance becomes. We can also see that, in all
cases, enhancing the SPNs always yields greater performance
and the performance differences become more significant as
the image blocks get bigger.
Another useful measure for demonstrating the performance
of the methods is false positive. Table III shows the false posi-
tive rates when a correlation threshold of 0.01 is applied. Note
that, in this experiment, the SPN of each image is compared to
the five reference SPNs of the cameras that are not the source
camera of the image in question. The image is deemed as taken
by the cameras that are not the source camera if their similarity
values are greater than a threshold 0.01. From Table III, the per-
formance differences are even more prominent when the image
block sizes are small. An interesting phenomenon, which can
be observed from Table III, is that for both methods, when scan-
ning from the right-hand side of the table, the false positive rates
decrease slightly and reach the minimum when the image block
size is 1024 1024 pixels. The false positive rates then increase
significantly afterwards. This is particularly clear for the case
without enhancement. After applying other threshold values of
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TABLE II
TRUE POSITIVE RATES WITH AND WITHOUT APPLYING MODEL 5 TO THE SPNS WITH     . NOTE THAT IN THIS EXPERIMENT THE IMAGE IS DEEMED AS
TAKEN BY THE SOURCE CAMERA IF THE SIMILARITY VALUE IS GREATER THAN A THRESHOLD 0.01
TABLE III
FALSE POSITIVE RATES WITH AND WITHOUT APPLYING MODEL 5 TO THE SPNS WITH     . NOTE THAT IN THIS EXPERIMENT THE IMAGE IS DEEMED AS
TAKEN BY THE CAMERAS THAT ARE NOT THE SOURCE CAMERA IF THEIR SIMILARITY VALUES ARE GREATER THAN A THRESHOLD 0.01
TABLE IV
IDENTIFICATION RATES WITH COLOR SATURATION TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT
0.005, 0.015, 0.02, 0.025, and 0.03, we observed the same phe-
nomenon. We have no explanation for this at present, but it is
interesting to look into the reasons in the future.
Tables II and III have validated the hypothesis and demon-
strated the superiority of the proposed SPN enhancing model.
Fig. 2(d) shows the enhanced version of Fig. 2(c) after Model
5, with , is applied. We can see that the influential details
from the scene, that are prominent in Fig. 2(c), have been sig-
nificantly removed from Fig. 2(d).
C. Impact of Color Saturation
In many photos, the upper-left or upper-right corners are ho-
mogeneous background, such as the sky or a wall of plain color,
where the SPN is less contaminated by details from the scenes
than other areas. Therefore, if only a block is to be taken from a
photo for forensic analysis, either one of these two corners are
good candidates because the probability of getting a low-vari-
ation block from these two corners is greater than from other
areas. Based on this rationale, we have also carried out the same
camera identification experiment on image blocks of 128
128 pixels cropped from theses two corners and the center of the
1200 photos. The results are listed in Table IV. Each number in
the “No. saturated blocks” row is the number of saturated blocks
out of 1200 blocks cropped from different areas of interest. In
our experiment, if over 50% of the pixels of a block have the
intensities of all three color channels equal to 255, the block is
deemed as saturated. The “No. saturated blocks” row conforms
to our expectation that the two corners at the top of photos are
more likely to be saturated than the central area. The “Identi-
fication rate (%): Saturation included” row of Table IV shows
that when the saturated blocks are included in the identification
experiment, the identification rates based on the blocks cropped
from different areas of interest are almost the same. Note that
a conclusion could not be drawn from this row alone, because
these three statistics may vary when a different data set is used.
However, this row is helpful in demonstrating the impact of
color saturation when comparing the statistics in the “Identifica-
tion rate (%): Saturation excluded” row. This later row indicates
that, when those saturated blocks are excluded, the identification
rates based on the blocks cropped from the two corners are sig-
nificantly higher than that based on the blocks cropped from the
center of images. This is not a surprising observation because
usually the main objects appear in the center of photos, where
normal imaging and illumination conditions are met, while the
two corners at the top of photos are more likely to be saturated
due to imaging and illumination conditions, thus giving rise to
the loss of SPN. So we suggest that blocks be taken from the
center of photos if the SPNs of small image blocks cropped au-
tomatically by the system are to be used for forensic applica-
tions, such as unsupervised image classification.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have pointed out that SPN, as the finger-
print for identifying source imaging devices, extracted with the
commonly used model of (1) proposed in [6], can be severely
contaminated by the details from the scene. To circumvent this
limitation, we envisaged the hypothesis that the stronger a com-
ponent of the SPN is, the less trustworthy the component should
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be and proposed five enhancing models (Models 1–5) for real-
izing the hypothesis, with Models 3, 4, and 5 being more prefer-
able. The hypothesis was tested by assigning greater weighting
to the smaller SPN components. Experiments on source device
identification have confirmed the soundness of our hypothesis.
Another related digital forensics application is that there are
circumstances where a forensic investigator has a large set of
images taken by an unknown number of unknown digital cam-
eras and wishes to cluster those images into a number of classes,
each including the images acquired by the same camera. The
main challenges in this scenario are as follows:
1) The forensic investigator does not have the cameras that
have taken the images to generate reference SNPs for com-
parison.
2) No prior knowledge about the number and types of the
imaging devices are available.
3) With a large data set, exhaustive and iterative pair-wise
SPN comparison is computationally prohibitive.
4) Given the shear number of images, analyzing each image
in its full size is computationally infeasible.
In the near future, we intend to devise an unsupervised image
classifier based on the enhanced SPN using our SPN enhancers
to address the aforementioned issues.
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